INTRODUCTION
In Wayte v. United States,' the Supreme Court 2 held that the United States government's passive enforcement policy, under which the Department of Justice prosecuted only those young men who reported themselves, or who were reported by others, as violators of the law requiring them to register with the Selective Service System, constituted neither selective prosecution nor violated the defendant's right to free speech. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had failed to show that the passive enforcement policy had the discriminatory effect and the discriminatory purpose required for a successful selective prosecution claim. 3 The Court also concluded that the defendant, who had publicly stated his opposition to registration with the Selective Service, could not demonstrate that the policy created an unjustified limitation upon his first amendment right to free speech. 4 II. FACTUAL SUMMARY On July 2, 1980, President Carter issued a Presidential Proclamation 5 requiring male citizens born during 1960 to register with the Selective Service System. 6 Although required to register, David Alan Wayte did not do so. Instead, on August 4, 1980, Wayte wrote letters to the President and the Selective Service declaring that he did not intend to register. 7 The Selective Service adopted a passive enforcement policy whereby it would investigate and prosecute only those nonregistrants brought to its attention. 8 This pool of reported violators included those men who reported themselves to the government, like Wayte, and those men who were reported by third parties. 9 On June 17, 1981, the Selective Service sent letters to suspected violators. 10 This letter explained the duty to register, requested that the addressee comply by filling out an enclosed registration form, and warned of criminal prosecution for continued non-compliance. 1 Wayte received the letter, but did not respond. In July 1981, the Selective Service turned over to the Department of Justice the files of 134 men, including Wayte, identified through the passive enforcement system. 13 The Department ofJustice referred the names of those nonregistrants still required to regvice Act, ch. 625, 62 Stat. 605 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. § 453(a) (1982)). Section 453(a) provides in pertinent part:
[I]t shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States.... who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be determined by proclamation of the President and by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder. 50 U.S.C. App. § 453(a).
6 Males born in 1961 were to register during the week ofJuly 28, 1980 . Those born in 1962 were to register during the week ofJanuary 5, 1981. Males born afterJanuary 1, 1963 are to register within 30 days before or after their eighteenth birthday. Proclamation No. 4771, reprinted in 50 U.S.C. App. § 453, at 233.
Although one registering under the Military Selective Service Act might say he is "registering for the draft," no one currently is being drafted in the United States. "The United States requires only that young men register for military service while most other major countries of the world require actual service." 105 S. Ct. at 1527 n.1 (emphasis in original).
7 In his first letter to the Selective Service, Wayte wrote, "I have not registered for the draft. I plan never to register. I realize the possible consequences of my action, and I accept them." 105 S. Ct. at 137, n.2. Wayte's second letter to the Selective Service stated in part: "Well, I did not register, and still plan never to do so, but thus far I have received no reply to my letter, much less any news about your much-threatened prosecutions." Id.
8 Id. at 1528. ister to the F.B.I. for additional investigation. 14 The United States Attorney for the district in which each nonregistrant in this group resided was notified of these investigations. 15 The Justice Department did not immediately begin prosecutions.1 6 Instead, the Department established what became known as the "beg" policy.' 7 Under this policy, United States Attorneys were first required to notify the suspected nonregistrants that unless they registered within a specified time, the Department would begin prosecution procedures.' 8 The Department's policy was to notify each nonregistrant that criminal investigation had actually begun but would be terminated if the nonregistrant would register prior to indictment.' 9 The United States Attorney for the Central District of California sent such a letter to Wayte on October 15, 1981.20 Wayte again failed to respond.
2 '
In December 1981, the Justice Department imposed a moratorium on efforts to indict nonregistrants. 22 In January 1982, President Reagan established a grace period, allowing nonregistrants to register without penalty until February 28, 1982.23 Wayte did not register during the grace period. The Justice Department recognized that the passive enforcement system would lead to prosecutions of "a large sample of persons who object on religious and moral grounds and persons who publicly refuse to register." 2 5 The Department also recognized that each nonregistrant prosecuted under the passive system would probably allege that his prosecution was "in retribution for the nonregistrant's exercise of his first amendment rights." 26 tive privilege. 3 8 After an evidentiary hearing on the selective prosecution claim, 3 9 the court ordered the government to produce certain documents and Mr. Meese. The government declined to do so and requested that the district judge dismiss the indictment in order to allow an appeal.
40
On November 15, 1982, the district court dismissed the indictment. 4 1 The court held that Wayte had established a prima facie case of selective prosecution which the government had failed to rebut.
The court held that Wayte had met the first requirement by showing that of the thousands c9f nonregistrants, all those prosecuted were vocal opponents of registration. 45 The court reasoned 38 Id. at 1383. 39 The pretrial evidentiary hearing on the selective prosecution claim took place on October 7, 1982. At the hearing, David J. Kline, Senior Legal Advisor in the General Litigation and Legal Advice Section, Criminal Division, Department ofJustice, and Richard Romero, the Assistant U.S Attorney prosecuting Wayte, testified for the government. The government submitted the affidavits of Jensen, Turnage and Edward Frankle, former Associate Director of Selective Service. Id. at 1382.
40 Id. at 1379. "The government respectfully declined to comply [with the district court's production order] and suggested that the court dismiss the indictment in order to allow an appeal to be pursued with respect to the validity of the sweeping discovery ordered by the court." Brief for the United States at 13, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 Ct. (1985 .
41 549 F. Supp. at 1391. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice based on its finding of selective prosecution. Id. 42 In the October 29th order directing the government to produce Mr. Meese to testify, the court also found that the defendant had established a prima facie case of selective prosecution. 549 F. Supp. at 1378 n.1.
Because the government refused to comply with the order, it could not rebut that finding. According to the court, the refusal "raise [d] The court finds it hard to believe that the prosecutive arm of the Government, with access to Social Security records, could not locate any nonregistrants other than those who were vocal in their opposition to draft registration." Id. The district court and Supreme Court may have ultimately reached opposite results in the case because the former believed the government could have implemented an active enforcement system much earlier, while the latter believed that that Wayte had satisfied the second requirement for three reasons. The court first noted that "an enforcement procedure that focuses upon the vocal offender is inherently suspect .... "46 Second, the court pointed out that the government knew that the passive enforcement system would raise "thorny selective prosecution claims." 4 7 Finally, "[t]he involvement of Mr. Meese and the Presidential Military Manpower Task Force in prosecutorial decisions creates... a strong inference of impropriety with regard to the Government's motive in seeking the prosecution of this defendant .... 48 Once the defendant had established a prima facie case, the court held that the burden of proof shifted to the government. 49 The court dismissed the case because the government failed to bear that burden. 50 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 5 1 The court of appeals applied the same two-pronged test used by the district court, but concluded that Wayte had not satisfied the second requirement. 52 Wayte met the first requirement by showing that all nonregistrants indicted to date, out of thousands of nonregistrants, were vocal opponents of registration. 53 The court of appeals, however, held that Wayte had failed to establish a case of selective prosecution because "Wayte ha [d] not shown that he was selected from the larger group [of all nonregistrants] because of his exercise of his constitutional rights." 54 The court admitted that Wayte's evidence and internal government documents did show that the government was aware that the passive enforcement system would result in prosecutions of vocal nonregistrants, who would then probably make selective prosecution claims. 55 
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concluded that "the district court's finding of selective prosecution was clearly erroneous." 5 6
IV.
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION After the court of appeals reversed the district court's finding of selective prosecution, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the selective prosecution issue. 57 The Supreme Court affirmed the deci-56 Id. at 1388. The court of appeals approved of two justifications for the passive enforcement policy that the government offered. First, the government pointed out that the identities of other nonregistrants were not known. Id. The district court had said that "[tihe inference is strong that the Government could have located non-vocal nonregistrants, but chose not to." 549 F. Supp. at 1381. The court of appeals declined to draw the district court's inference and accepted the government's first explanation. 710 F.2d at 1388.
The government's second explanation was that vocal nonregistrants had expressed their willful violation of the law. The court of appeals accepted this as a permissible motive "in making prosecutorial decisions." Id. Judge Schroeder, in her dissent, rejected this explanation. She pointed out that a nonregistrant's refusal to register when offered the opportunity during the government's "beg" procedures established the nonregistrant's willful violation of the law. Id. at 1390 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
The court of appeals accepted the government's explanations for the passive enforcement policy and thus held that the government had not based the policy on impermissible grounds. The Supreme Court would later also accept these two explanations while upholding the policy against Wayte's first amendment challenge. See text accompanying infra notes 79-83.
57 Wayte v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 2655 Ct. (1985 (granting certiorari limited to the first question in the petition). The petitioner's first question was: "May the United States validly investigate and prosecute for refusal to register with the Selective Service only those individuals who are selected pursuant to an enforcement program designed to identify vocal opponents to draft registration?" Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit at i, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 Ct. (1985 .
The majority was thus correct when it refused to decide whether Wayte was entitled to discover government documents regarding his selective prosecution claim, an issue discussed by the dissent, because that issue "was neither raised in the petition for certiorari, briefed on the merits, nor raised at oral argument." 105 S. Ct. at 1530 n.5.
The Court granted certiorari because of the importance of the selective prosecution issue and because of a conflict between the circuits on that issue. In United States v. Eklund, 733 F.2d 1287 (8th Cir. 1984)(en banc), the court of appeals held that the nonregistrant had failed to show that the government had based its prosecution of him on an impermissible ground-his right of free speech. 733 F.2d at 1295. Although the court assumed that Eklund had shown he was singled out for prosecution from the thousands of non-vocal nonregistrants, because the second requirement for a selective prosecution claim was not met, the court upheld Eklund's conviction. In United States v. Schmucker, 721 F.2d 1046 (6th Cir. 1983), the court of appeals reversed the defendant's conviction for failure to register. Id. at 1048. The court concluded that the defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of selective prosecution.
After the Court's decision in Wayte, the Court resolved the conflict by granting certiorari in Schmucker. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and remanded for consideration in light of Wayte. United States v. Schmucker, 105 S. Ct. 1860 Ct. (1985 . sion of the court of appeals. 5s
The Court first noted that a prosecutor in our criminal justice system "retains 'broad discretion' as to whom to prosecute." 59 The
Court stated that there are "substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.
The court wrote, however, that constitutional constraints prevent a prosecutor from basing his decision on race, religion, or the exercise of constitutional rights.
6 '
The Court, applying "ordinary equal protection standards," 6 2 first addressed Wayte's selective prosecution claim. In order to establish selective prosecution, the Court stated that Wayte must "show both that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. "63 Thus, the Court applied the same two-pronged test applied by the district court and the court of appeals. The Court concluded that Wayte had failed to show that the passive prosecution system had had a discriminatory effect upon vocal nonregistrants. 64 The Court examined "the pool of potential prosecutees" 6 5 and the pool of defendants and concluded that those nonregistrants "similarly situated" to Wayte were only those who were known to the government, not nonregistrants whom the government could not identify at the The Court cited the effects of the Justice Department's "beg" policy as evidence of the lack of discriminatory effect upon the indictees as members of the pool of potential prosecutees:
The Government did not prosecute those who reported themselves but later registered. Nor did it prosecute those who protested registration but did not report themselves or were not reported by others .... The Government, on the other hand, did prosecute people who reported themselves or were reported by others but who did not publicly protest. These facts demonstrate that the Government treated all reported nonregistrants similarly.
67
Thus, although both the district court and the court of appeals had concluded that Wayte had met the first requirement of the two-pronged test, the Supreme Court ruled that Wayte had failed to show a discriminatory effect. The Court then examined Wayte's evidence of discriminatory purpose. 68 The Court concluded that Wayte had also failed to demonstrate that the government had intended a discriminatory result. 6 9 The Court admitted, as the court of appeals had, that Wayte's evidence revealed that the government was aware that the passive enforcement system would result in prosecutions of vocal nonregistrants who would likely make selective prosecution claims. 70 The Court wrote that "'discriminatory purpose' implies more than intent as awareness of consequences. It implies that the decisionmaker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."' T The Court next addressed Wayte's argument that the passive enforcement policy violated his first amendment right to free speech. 72 Ct. 1524 Ct. (1985 . Cf. 105 S. Ct. at 1539 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). and non-speech elements 73 and applied a four-part test.
First, the regulation must be "within the constitutional power of the Government." 74 Second, it must further "an important or substantial governmental interest. ' 75 Third, "the governmental interest . . . [must be] unrelated to the suppression of free expression." ' 76 Finally, "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be] no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. ' 77 The Court dismissed the first and third requirements without discussion because Wayte did not claim that the passive enforcement system failed to satisfy them.
78
The Court examined the three reasons offered by the government to show that the passive enforcement policy furthered a "substantial governmental interest" and thus satisfied the second requirement. The Court accepted the government's argument that the passive policy allowed the government "to identify and prosecute violators without further delay." 7 9 The Court agreed that the "passive enforcement program thus promoted prosecutorial effi- The passive enforcement policy also met the fourth requirement that a regulation be no broader than necessary. Noting the difficulties that the Selective Service had in acquiring names and current addresses for an active enforcement system, the Court wrote that " [p] . Before concluding the opinion, the Court made an observation about the implications of Wayte's first amendment argument. The Court wrote that Wayte's argument concerned self-reporting rather than passive enforcement. The Court pointed out that if a court should accept such an argument, a criminal could use the first amendment as a shield against prosecution. A criminal could commit a crime, report himself as a protesting violator of the law in question, and thus obtain immunity. The Court wrote that " [t] he First Amendment confers no such immunity from prosecution." Id. at 1534.
86 Id. at 1535 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 87 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 88 Justice Marshall adopted his three-part test for a prima facie case of selective prosecution from Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) , a case involving an equal protection challenge to grand jury selection procedures. Wayte would establish a prima fade case, Marshall wrote, by showing: 1) "that he is a member of a recognizable, distinct class;" 2) "that a disproportionate number of this class was selected for investigation and possible prosecution;" and 3) "that this selection procedute was subject to abuse or otherwise not neutral." 105 S. Ct. at 1541 (citing Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494). Marshall concluded that Wayte had shown sufficient evidence of each requirement. I&. at 1542.
discretion by finding that Wayte had made out a prima facie case. 8 9 Marshall thus focused on the elements of the prima facie case and the appropriate standard of appellate review. 90 Finally, Justice Marshall argued that the Court had erred in analyzing the merits of the selective prosecution claim. The majority had focused on the government's treatment of known nonregistrants in holding that the government had not discriminated against the indicted nonregistrants as members of the known group of nonregistrants. 9 1 Justice Marshall reasoned that the Court should have focused upon the fact that the passive system identified for prosecution only those nonregistrants who had exercised their first amendment rights. 9 2 Marshall agreed, however, that Wayte would need to show discriminatory intent in order to invalidate the passive enforcement system on equal protection grounds. 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
First, applying the traditional two-pronged test, the Court held that Wayte had failed to show that the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect on vocal nonregistrants. 9 5 Both lower courts held that Wayte had shown discriminatory effect, 96 but the Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reached this result because it refused to accept Wayte's contention that he and 674,00098 other nonregistrants were similarly situated. 9 9 The lower courts had concluded that the pas-89 105 S. Ct. at 1540 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 90 Justice Marshall believed the court of appeals had conducted de novo review of Wayte's claim, rather than looking solely at whether or not the district court had abused its discretion. 105 S. Ct. at 1540 (Marshall, J., dissenting). [Vol. 76 sive enforcement system had a discriminatory effect based on the fact that all of the indicted nonregistrants were vocally opposed to the draft, while thousands of silent nonregistrants went unprosecuted. 10 0 The Court, however, preferred to characterize them not as "silent,"'' 1 1 but rather as "unreported," "unknown" or "temporarily unidentifiable" nonregistrants. 10 2 Wayte was not similarly situated to the thousands of nonregistrants, the Court reasoned, because he was a reported and known violator. 0 3 The Court's statement of facts details the government's unsuccessful efforts to establish an active enforcement system prior to Wayte's indictment.104 The Court, unlike the district court judge, 0 5 apparently viewed the government's efforts as reasonable and in good faith. 10 6 Had the Court believed, for example, the district court judge's statement that "[t]he inference is strong that the Government could have located non-vocal non-registrants, but chose not to,"' 0 1 7 the Court might have decided in Wayte's favor. Thus, the Court apparently assumed that when a law enforcement agency makes reasonable and good faith efforts to identify all violators of a particular law, the proper focus for the discriminatoryeffect prong of the two-pronged test is upon the prosecutor's treatment of the known violators. A court need not take unknown violators into account in resolving a defendant's selective prosecution claim when the prosecuting authority's good faith efforts to identify all violators have failed. Because Wayte could not show that he had 100 549 F. Supp. at 1391. See also 710 F.2d at 1387. 101 The Court stated that the term "vocal non-registrant" was "misleading insofar as it suggests that all those indicted had made public statements opposing registration. In some cases, the only statement made by the nonregistrant prior to indictment was his letter to the Government declaring his refusal to register." 105 S. Ct. at 1530, n.6. Cf. Brief for the United States at 25 n.18, Wayte v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1524 Ct. (1985 .
102 Although the Court never explicitly used any of these terms to refer to the socalled "silent" nonregistrants, the Court repeatedly used the word "reported" to refer to the nonregistrants identified by the passive enforcement system. been treated differently from other known nonregistrants, the existence of unknown nonregistrants could not establish discriminatory effect. The Court, after finding that Wayte had failed to show discriminatory effect, nevertheless applied the second part of the traditional test for selective prosecution. The Court inquired whether the government's use of the passive enforcement system had a discriminatory purpose and concluded that it did not because Wayte had "not shown that the Government prosecuted him because of his protest activities." 1 08 The Court admitted that the government was aware of the probability that vocal nonregistrants would be prosecuted under the passive system. 0 9 The Court, however, distinguished the government's decision to knowingly proceed on a course of action "in spite of" adverse effects on a particular group from knowingly proceeding "because of' those adverse effects. 110 Had the Court not made this distinction, it would have confused "discriminatory purpose" with mere knowledge of discriminatory effects. When a person acts with a purpose,"' he deliberately acts to achieve a goal or objective. On the other hand, when one acts with knowledge of his action's effects, he may or may not be acting with those effects as his objectives. In the former instance he acts because of the action's effects; in the latter instance he acts, perhaps, in spite of those effects.
Confusion over the Court's definition of "discriminatory purpose" in the equal protection context results from the criminal and tort laws' presumption that a defendant intended his voluntary act."
12
The defendant's tortious or criminal intent is presumed when he knew the consequences of his act.' 1 3 While defining "discriminatory purpose," the Court has explicitly rejected the common law's con- The Court's "because of" definition for discriminatory purpose is especially appropriate when the Court subjects a prosecutor's decision-making to an equal protection analysis. If the Court were to hold that a prosecutor's knowledge of a prosecutorial policy's discriminatory effects constituted an impermissible discriminatory purpose, a perverse incentive would be created. Prosecutors would in effect be encouraged to avoid knowing or researching the effects of their own prosecutorial policies.11 5 Ignorance of a policy's effects would be the simplest means of defending the policy against an equal protection challenge. REv. 102 (1984) .
Defendants in the federal courts have brought hundreds of claims of selective prosecution based on their First Amendment rights. See Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 732 (1979) (cases far too numerous to cite here). The federal courts, however, have only upheld these claims in three cases, and in each case the court required the defendant to show mined that a prosecutorial policy or system adversely affected those violators exercising their first amendment rights compared to those who remained silent, the court would strike down the policy without inquiring into the prosecutor's motive or intent. 1 19 The Court never directly rejected Wayte's argument, but did so indirectly by refusing to adopt or formulate such a new test. The Court addressed the selective prosecution claim by applying the traditional two-pronged test. 1 20 The Court then applied the traditional O'Brien 12 ' balancing test to the first amendment challenge. Because the Court did not directly address the issue, all that the decision states on its face is that, under the circumstances before it, the Court was unwilling to remove the discriminatory purpose requirement from its equal protection analysis simply because the first amendment was involved. It is not clear how the Court would have held if the Court had found, as the lower lower courts had, that the passive system had a discriminatory effect on first amendment rights, but had then found no discriminatory purpose on the government's part.
Although the dissent discussed the standard used to decide when a defendant has established a prima facie case of selective prosecution and thus shifted the burden to the government, the majority refused to address the matter. The majority thus declined to lay down a rule as to when a defendant is entitled to discovery on his claim of selective prosecution. The majority's silence may be deemed tacit approval of the standards used by lower courts.
2
The Court's opinion resolved the immediate dispute between the parties. The Court also resolved the conflict between the circuits regarding the use of the selective prosecution defense against indictments and convictions under the passive enforcement system discriminatory purpose in order to succeed with the claim. 
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[Vol. 76 where a criminal, by reporting his own crime, could use the first amendment as a shield against prosecution. By the time of the Court's decision, the Selective Service System had abandoned the passive enforcement system and had adopted an active system for identifying nonregistrants. Because those indicted under the active system will be unable to make selective prosecution claims, Justice Powell wisely wrote a narrow opinion that decided the case before the Court, resolved the conflict between the circuits, and avoided unnecessarily broad pronouncements on selective prosecution.
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